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Comment
Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co.:
Protecting Employees Under ERISA by
Construing Ambiguous Plan Terms
Against the Insurer
Mark Traynor
Daniel Kunin submitted a claim to Benefit Trust Life In-
surance Company for over $50,000 in medical expenses incurred
from his son's treatment for autism in 1986.1 Benefit Trust re-
fused to reimburse Kunin fully because its plan administrator
determined that autism fell within a policy term limiting cover-
age for "mental illness" to $10,000.2 Because Kunin's employer
purchased a group health insurance policy that was part of a
benefit plan governed by ERISA,3 Kunin filed suit in federal
district court, claiming that Benefit Trust acted contrary to ER-
ISA in denying benefits.4 The district court found that Benefit
Trust acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and ordered full
coverage. 5
In Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co.,6 the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's determination, holding that
Benefit Trust did not have adequate grounds for concluding
that autism was a mental illness.7 The court also held that,
since "mental illness" was an ambiguous term, the rule of con-
tra proferentem, by which ambiguous terms in a written agree-
ment are construed against its drafter, dictated construction
against Benefit Trust.8
Contra proferentem ("the rule") has received mixed re-
1. Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 535 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 803 (1991).
2. Id.
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (1988).
4. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 535.
5. Id.
6. 910 F.2d 534.
7. Id at 538.
8. Id. at 541.
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views in the context of ERISA contracts. 9 The Ninth Circuit's
holding in Kunin, that the rule should apply to ERISA plans,
runs contrary to the Eighth Circuit's position that the rule
should not apply to ERISA cases.10 The circuit split over this
question undermines the uniformity of treatment of ERISA is-
sues and raises significant concerns about the distribution of
medical costs between contracting parties. Insurers fear courts
will all too readily apply the rule for the sake of equity even
when contract language is not ambiguous or could be given
meaning with extrinsic evidence. Employees, who often feel
vulnerable in the bargaining relationship with insurers and face
potentially ruinous costs if denied coverage, seek any leverage
that the rule can provide to protect their interests under
ERISA.
This Comment critiques the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Kunin. While finding fault with the court's reasoning, this
Comment ultimately agrees that a version of the contra profer-
entem rule should apply to ERISA plans, either through fed-
eral common law or by an amendment to ERISA. Part I
explores the legal context of Kunin and discusses the continu-
ing nature of the controversy in subsequent cases. Part II de-
scribes the Kunin decision itself. Part III analyzes Kunin, and
considers whether ERISA preempts the contra proferentem
rule, whether precedent permits favoring one party in constru-
ing a term in an ERISA plan, and whether the rule can be fash-
ioned into a federal common-law rule. Part III also offers
alternative proposals to reconcile applying the contra profer-
entem rule to ERISA plans. The first proposal applies the rule
of contra proferentem to ERISA contracts through federal com-
mon law, but recognizes the shortcomings of blanket applica-
tion to the myriad possible ERISA plans. The second proposal
involves an amendment to ERISA that would rectify the poten-
tial problems of common-law application by construing ambigu-
ous terms in all ERISA plans in the employee's best interest.
9. This Comment uses the terms "contract" and "plan" synonymously.
Technically, the terms could have different meanings. For example, an em-
ployee benefit plan may include an insurance contract that describes the medi-
cal or life benefits under the plan, so that they can be understood as separate
entities. Any distinction between the terms, however, is not relevant to the
arguments advanced in this Comment. Regardless of whether contra profer-
entem can be understood to affect "plans" or "contracts," concerns surround-
ing application of the rule would be the same.
10. See Brewer v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150, 153-54 (8th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2872 (1991).
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I. KUNIN'S LEGAL CONTEXT
A. THE CONTRA PROFERENTEM RULE AND INSURANCE
CONTRACTS
The rule of contra proferentem provides that ambiguous
terms in a contract be construed against their drafter."' Rooted
in common law, this rule of contract construction historically
has applied to adhesion contracts, particularly insurance con-
tracts.' 2 Indeed, the contra proferentem rule has evolved into
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) ("In choosing
among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or term thereof,
that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who sup-
plies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds."); see also
BLAC'S LAw DICTIONARY 327 (6th ed. 1990) ("Used in connection with the
construction of written documents to the effect that an ambiguous provision is
construed most strongly against the person who selected the language.").
Some commentators and courts refer to the rule as contra proferentem.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Hoke, Contract Interpretation in Commercial Insurance
Disputes: The Status of the Sophisticated Insured Exception and Alternatives
to the Ambiguity Rule, 40 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 259, 261 (1990). Con-
tra proferentem literally means "[a]gainst the party who proffers or puts for-
ward a thing." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 327 (6th ed. 1990). Others use the
term "ambiguity doctrine" or "ambiguity rule" to describe the principle of con-
struing ambiguous terms against the drafter. See, e.g., David S. Miller, Note,
Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doc-
trine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849 (1988).
12. It has been almost the unanimous holding of all courts that insur-
ance contracts must be liberally construed in favor of a policyholder
or beneficiary thereof, wherever possible, and strictly construed
against the insurer in order to afford the protection which the insured
was endeavoring to secure when he applied for the insurance. The
courts have felt that the language of insurance policies is selected by
one of the parties alone, and the language employed by that party
should be construed against it. Thus, if the meaning of the words em-
ployed is doubtful or uncertain, or if for any reason an ambiguity ex-
ists either in the policy as a whole or in portions thereof, the insured
should have the benefit of a favorable construction in such instance.
13 JOHN A. APPLEmAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 7401 (1976) (citations omitted); see also 2 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON IN-
SURANCE § 15:83 (1984) ("It is only when the language in the contract is ambig-
uous, or open to construction, that the rule obtains that it will be strictly
construed against the insurer."); ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND
DISPUTES § 6.02 (1988) ("If ... the insurance contract is fairly susceptible of
two different interpretations, another rule of construction will be applied: the
interpretation that is most favorable to the insured will be adopted.").
While insurance contracts formerly were the product of equal, arm's-
length bargaining, the incorporation of insurance companies in America in the
1790s and the subsequent marketing of fire insurance policies to individuals
created inequalities in the bargaining relationship that encouraged courts to
apply the rule. Miller, supra note 11, at 1851. As a standard form contract
that forces the insured to accept its terms without negotiation, the insurance
contract is often called an adhesion contract. Id- at 1854.
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one of the most fundamental and widely used methods of inter-
preting insurance contracts.'3 Both federal and state courts ap-
ply the rule,14 most commonly to insurance contracts where
the insured contracts directly with the insurer. Some courts
also apply it to cases where an employer purchases a group pol-
icy.15 The rule's central rationale is that un-negotiated contract
terms and unequal bargaining power between parties demand
that the law tip interpretation against the more sophisticated
insurer, and in favor of the insured.16
Courts differ, however, in their use of the rule. Some use
the rule as a last resort, applying it only after extrinsic evi-
dence has failed to clarify the meaning of the terms.17 Other
courts apply the rule automatically on finding a term facially
ambiguous.' 8
13. Barry R. Ostrager & David W. Ichel, Should the Business Insurance
Policy Be Construed Against the Insurer? Another Look at the Reasonable Ex-
pectations Doctrine, 33 FED'N INS. CoUNs. Q. 273, 275 n.12 (1983). Every state
employs some version of the rule of contra proferentem to insurance contracts.
See Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 535 (9th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 803 (1991).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 210, 216 (1970); West-
chester Resco Co. v. New England Reinsurance Corp., 818 F.2d 2, 3 (2d Cir.
1987); Landress Auto Wrecking Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co.,
696 F.2d 1290, 1292 (l1th Cir. 1983); HKH Co. v. American Mortgage Ins. Co.,
685 F.2d 315, 319 (9th Cir. 1982); Miles v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 381
So. 2d 13, 14 (Ala. 1980); Connie's Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 227
N.W.2d 207, 210 (Iowa 1975); Travelers Ins. Co. v. North Seattle Christian &
Missionary Alliance, 650 P.2d 250, 254 (Wash. 1982).
15. See Lessard v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 568 A.2d 491, 500 (Me. 1989);
Kyte v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 549 S.W.2d 366, 367-68 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977). But see Blue Cross, Inc. v. Ayotte, 315 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1001 (App. Div.
1970) (declining to apply the contra proferentem rule to an employer-funded
group health policy).
16. Hoke, supra note 11, at 262; Ostrager & Ichel, supra note 13, at 278-79.
Other justifications for employing the rule to interpret insurance contracts in-
clude detrimental reliance by the insured, the quasi-public nature of the insur-
ance industry, the efficiency of risk-spreading, judicial paternalism, and
traditional doctrines of equity. Miller, supra note 11, at 1855-57.
17. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 10 n.2 (2d Cir.
1983); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir.
1982); Rich Maid Kitchens, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co.,
641 F. Supp., 297, 307, 309 (E.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd mem., 833 F.2d 307 (3d Cir.
1987); Rainier Credit Co. v. Western Alliance Corp., 217 Cal. Rptr. 291, 295
(1985); Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 609 A.2d 1087, 1092 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1991); M-Z Enters., Inc. v. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co., 318 N.W.2d 408,
412 (Iowa 1982); Collier v. MD-Individual Practice Ass'n, Inc., 607 A.2d 537, 539
(Md. 1992).
18. E.g., Bruder v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 596 N.E.2d 875, 878 (Ill. App.
Ct.), appeal granted, 602 N.E.2d 447 (Il. 1992); Eli Lilly Co. v. Home Ins. Co.,
482 N.E.2d 467, 470 (Ind. 1985); Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 827 S.W.2d
1222 [Vol. 77:1219
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Recently, some courts have begun to limit the application
of the rule to insurance contracts where the parties bargained
with unequal leverage and did not negotiate the terms of the
contract.'9 Thus, even in jurisdictions that normally apply the
rule, courts may sometimes not apply it to insurance contracts
between large, sophisticated corporations and equally sophisti-
cated insurance companies. 20 Still, many jurisdictions continue
to wield the rule of contra proferentem in any case where an
insurance contract contains ambiguous terms.2 '
208, 210 (Mo. 1992); United States Bronze Powders, Inc. v. Commerce & Indus.
Ins. Co., 611 A.2d 667, 670 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1992); Gunn v. Aetna Life & Casualty
Co., 629 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981); Tempelis v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 485 N.W.2d 217, 221 (Wis. 1992).
A recent development of the law in insurance contracts does not even re-
quire courts to find ambiguity before construing a provision against the
drafter. All that is needed is for a particular interpretation to meet the in-
sured's "reasonable expectations." The most famous explanation of the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine provides that "[t]he objectively reasonable
expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of
insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the pol-
icy provisions would have negated those expectations." Robert E. Keeton, In-
surance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. REV. 961,
967 (1970). Fulfilling the reasonable expectations of the insured is an even
more liberal rule of construction than the contra proferentem rule because the
reasonable expectations doctrine does not require the terms to be ambiguous.
See WINDT, supra note 12, § 6.03. The number of jurisdictions applying some
form of the reasonable expectations doctrine appears to be growing, with as
many as 16 states using it in 1990. Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Rea-
sonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J.
823 n.5 (1990). The chief complaint against the doctrine is that courts have
been unable to apply it in a consistent manner, undermining its power as a
solid legal rule. Id. at 824.
19. See Ostrager & Ichel, supra note 13, at 286-90; see also First State Ins.
Underwriters Agency Reinsurance Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 803 F.2d 1308,
1314 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that the rule of contra proferentem does not
apply where sophisticated parties negotiated and executed an insurance con-
tract); Eagle Leasing Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 1257, 1261 (5th
Cir. 1986) (stating that no justification for rule exists "when the insured is not
an innocent but a corporation of immense size, carrying insurance with annual
premiums in six figures, managed by sophisticated business men, and repre-
sented by counsel on the same professional level as the counsel for insurers");
J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 466 F. Supp. 353, 366 (E.D.
La. 1979) (recommending no application of the rule when much of the lan-
guage of the insurance contract was drafted by the insured's broker); 13 AP-
PLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 12, § 7402, at 301 ("[lIt has been held that
the principle that ambiguities in policies should be strictly construed against
the insurer need not be strictly adhered to in instances where one large corpo-
ration and one large insurance company both advised by competent counsel do
business with each other.").
20. See supra note 19.
21. E.g., Ogden Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 681 F. Supp. 169, 173-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (rejecting exception to the rule for sophisticated insured); Aer-
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Courts also differ as to when an insurance contract term is
ambiguous. 22 Generally, courts determine ambiguity from the
standpoint of a reasonable layman interested in purchasing in-
surance.23 If a term is susceptible of different interpretations,
it is ambiguous.24 When determining ambiguity, courts may
also consider whether jurisdictions differ in their interpretation
of terms, and whether the insured understands the term.25
B. THE CONTRA PROFERENTEM RULE AND ERISA PLANS
ERISA governs employee-provided medical plans, whether
self-funded or provided through insurance.26 Congress passed
ojet-General Corp. v. San Mateo County Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621,
626 (Ct. App. 1989) (ignoring sophistication of insured and applying the rule);
National Tea Co. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 456 N.E.2d 206, 216 (111. App.
Ct. 1983) (upholding the application of the rule where the insured is a large
corporation). The rule of contra piroferentem, as well as the doctrine of rea-
sonable expectations, have been the targets of criticism on several fronts. The
primary complaint asserts that new realities, which militate against the rea-
sons behind its application, dictate severe limitations on the rule. See supra
note 19 and accompanying text (discussing policies and providing cases for lim-
iting the rule to the occasion where the insured is unsophisticated). The rule
also has been criticized for causing economic uncertainty and inefficiency for
insurance companies, which in turn increase premiums. Miller, supra note 11,
at 1860-62. Another criticism is that the judicial activism necessary to apply
the rule (especially in determining ambiguity) undermines the uniformity of
the law and weakens its precedential power. Id. at 1863-64; see Mary P. Benz,
Interpretation of Insurance Policies Governed by ERISA, 59 DEF. COUNS. J. 71,
78-79 (1992). The solution for these problems tends to involve application of
general contract principles, as provided in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS (1981), to ascertain the intent of the parties and to render justice
when necessary. See Benz, supra, at 77-79; Miller, supra note 11, at 1864-72;
Ostrager & Ichel, supra note 13, at 286-96. Critics do not abandon the rule en-
tirely, however, but apply it as a last resort after every effort is made to give
meaning to the disputed term. Benz, supra, at 77; Miller, supra note 11, at
1869.
22. For an interesting categorical approach to how courts determine ambi-
guity, see Miller, supra note 11, at 1853 n.28.
23. WINDT, supra note 12, § 6.02; 2 COUCH, supra note 12, § 15:84.
24. WINDT, supra note 12, § 6.02. However, the term in question should
not be labeled "ambiguous" for the sake of equity if the term is actually plain
and clear. 2 COUCH, supra note 12, § 15:84. The circumstances of the concrete
case and the overall context of the contract should be examined. 1d.; WINDT,
supra note 12, § 6.02.
25. Miller, supra note 11, at 1853 n.28; WINDT, supra note 12, § 6.02; 2
COUCH, supra note 12, § 15:84.
26. ERISA was created with four main effects in mind. First, ERISA pro-
tects participants and beneficiaries in employee benefit plans by constructing
individual statutory rights to enforce obligations through action in federal
courts. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988); EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAw 17 (Steven J.
Sacher et al. eds., 1991). Second, ERISA protects plan participants and benefi-
ciaries by regulating the design and operation of pension plans, and requiring
1224 [Vol. 77:1219
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ERISA to protect employee interests and to ensure uniform en-
forcement of pension laws.2 7 Prior to ERISA, courts considered
pensions and insurance plans under the vagaries of state con-
tract law.28 ERISA now establishes, nationwide, relationships
based on trust law, where an employer, union, or insurance
company may act as a fiduciary or trustee, and the employee
acts as a beneficiary.2 9 While ERISA applies to pensions and
welfare plans, this Comment focuses on the application of the
contra proferentem rule to welfare plans.30
The broad federal mandate of ERISA is manifested in its
preemption clause,31 which substantially blunts the force of
state laws on ERISA insurance contracts.32 Although the pre-
reporting and disclosure for welfare plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b), (c) (1988); EM-
PLOYEE BENEFITS LAw, supra, at 17. Third, ERISA creates a system of govern-
mental enforcement of rights under the legislation. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW,
supra, at 18. Fourth, ERISA buttresses the foregoing protections by providing
insurance protection for certain types of pension benefits. Id.
27. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109-10 (1989); Pi-
lot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987); EMPLOYEE BENEFrrS LAW,
supra note 26, at 18. For a list of the policy considerations driving ERISA, see
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988).
28. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 112-13; EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAw, supra note 26,
at 358.
29. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 109.
30. Welfare plans are defined in ERISA as any plan, fund or program es-
tablished to provide, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, health
benefits as well as benefits related to disability, accidents, death, and unem-
ployment. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988).
31. ERISA's preemption clause provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of
this chapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not
exempt under section 1003(b) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
32. "A recent LEXIS search indicates that there are now over 2,800 judi-
cial opinions addressing ERISA preemption." District of Columbia v. Greater
Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580, 586 n.3 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
issue of preemption in ERISA also has received considerable attention from
commentators. See E. Thomas Bishop & Paula Denney, Hello ERISA, Good-
Bye Bad Faith- Federal Pre-emption of DTPA, Insurance Code, and Common
Law Bad Faith Claims, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 267 (1989); Robert M. Chemers &
Robert J. Franco, The Preemption of State Claims Under ERISA, 78 ILL. B.J.
550 (1990); William A. Chittenden, III, ERISA Preemption: The Demise of Bad
Faith Actions in Group Insurance Cases, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 517 (1988); George
L. Flint, Jr., ERISA- Nonwaivability of Preemption, 39 KAN. L. REV. 297
(1991); David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study
in Effective Federalism, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 427 (1987); William J. Kilberg &
Paul D. Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans:
An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1313 (1984); Richard M.
Rindler & Evan Miller, Thoughts on a Faded Peacock The Effect of ERISA's
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emption clause covers any state law directed at employee bene-
fit plans, the "savings" clause in ERISA permits courts to apply
state laws that "regulate insurance."33 Self-insured plans,34 be-
cause they cannot be deemed part of the insurance industry,
Preemption Provision on State Third Party Prescription Drug Program Stat-
utes, 39 VAND. L. REV. 23 (1986); Steven L. Brown, Note, ERISA's Preemption
of Estoppel Claims Relating to Employee Benefit Plans, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1391
(1989); James R. Bruner, Note, AIDS and ERISA Preemption: The Double
Threat, 41 DUKE L.J. 1115 (1992); Caroline W. Cleveland, Note, ERISA Pre-
emption: As the Federal Courts Identify the Outer Boundaries of ERISA's Pre-
emption Clause, What Are the Implications for South Carolina State Actions?,
42 S.C. L. REV. 743 (1991); Laurie F. Hasencamp, Note, ERISA Preemption of
State Fair Employment Laws, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 583 (1986); Robert S. McDon-
ough, Note, ERISA Preemption of State Mandated-Provider Laws, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 1194; Shawn C. Moore, Casenote, Erisa Preemption of State Subrogation
Laws: Baxter v. Lynn and FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 43 ARK. L. REV. 477 (1990);
Karen L. Peterson, Comment, ERISA Preemption of California Tort and Bad
Faith Law: What's Left?, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 519 (1988); Keith A. Rabenberg,
Note, Punitive Damages and ERISA An Anomalous Effect of ERISA's Pre-
emption of Common Law Actions, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 589 (1987); Rosemary
Scariati, Note, The Effect of Choice of Law on Federal Jurisdiction Under ER-
ISA: Defining the Scope of the Act or Omission Preemption Exception, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 997 (1990); Lawrence A. Vranka, Jr., Note, Defining the
Contours of ERISA Preemption of State Insurance Regulation: Making Em-
ployee Benefit Plan Regulation an Exclusively Federal Concern, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 607 (1989).
33. The savings clause reads: "Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person
from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities."
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988).
Subparagraph (B), to which the savings clause refers, is called the
"deemer" clause. It provides in pertinent part:
Neither an employee benefit plan.. . nor any trust established under
such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company... or to be
engaged in the business of insurance... for purposes of any law of
any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance con-
tracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988).
Thus, if an ERISA plan is deemed to be involved with insurance to permit
state regulation, the relevant state law is not saved from preemption. See
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 409-10 (1990). The language of the sav-
ings clause and deemer clauses, and their relationship, caused the United
States Supreme Court to note they "are not a model of legislative drafting."
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985). At best
these clauses are unhelpful; at worst they will continue to provoke costly liti-
gation seeking to determine their meaning.
34. Self-insured plans are those where an employer or employer group
pools assets to establish the funds that are paid to beneficiaries under the
terms of the plan. EMPLOYEE BENEFrrs LAw, supra note 26, at 1051. While
the employer may contract with an insurance company or health maintenance
organization to administer the plan, such an organization does not collect the
premiums or bear the risk. Id. at 1051-52.
1226 [Vol. 77:1219
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are not affected by state laws regulating insurance.35
For the purpose of the savings clause, whether a state law
regulates insurance depends on two factors: the "common
sense" understanding of the savings clause and the case law in-
terpretation of "insurance. '3 6 Courts examine the state law in
question and decide if it regulates insurance by determining its
ability to transfer or spread an insured's risk, its importance to
the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured,
and the exclusivity of its application to the insurance
industry.
3 7
In addition to preemption issues, courts must address
whether ERISA permits favoring one party over the other in
construing plan terms. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
35. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. at 409-10; see infra note 37 (describing the analysis
in Holliday).
36. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1987).
37. Id. The Court borrowed these criteria from Union Labor Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982), which analyzed the phrase "busi-
ness of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The United States Supreme Court has visited the preemption issue (and
whether a state law regulates insurance) several times since the inception of
ERISA. Three cases appear worthy of note in relation to Kunin: Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Pilot Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); and FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct.
403 (1990).
In Metropolitan Life, the Court saved from preemption a state law that
mandated certain benefits in health insurance contracts governed by ERISA.
471 U.S. at 758. Applying the criteria defining the "business of insurance," the
Court found that "mandated-benefit laws are state regulation of the 'business
of insurance."' Id. at 743.
The Court in Dedeaux determined that the state common law action of
bad faith, allowing punitive damages for tortious breach of contract, was pre-
empted. 481 U.S. at 57. Since the plaintiff sought recovery against an insur-
ance company which funded the relevant plan, the Court analyzed whether
the state law of bad faith regulated insurance. The Court reasoned that a com-
mon-sense reading of the "business of insurance" revealed that the state law of
bad faith did not regulate the insurance industry, despite its longstanding ap-
plication to insurance contracts. Id. at 50. The Court's supported its holding
by concluding that the law of bad faith does not effect the spreading of policy-
holder risk. Id. Finally, the Court looked toward the enforcement scheme of
ERISA as evidence of Congressional intent to preempt state recovery laws. Id.
at 52-56.
Most recently, in Holliday, the Court held that ERISA preempted a state
statute that precluded ERISA plans from subrogating damages won by a tort
claimant. 111 S. Ct. at 411. The problem with the state regulation involved
the deemer clause of ERISA. While the law clearly regulated insurance to fall
within the savings clause, the regulated plan in question, which was self-
funded, could not be deemed an insurance company for the purpose of being
saved. Id. at 409. The law directly regulated employee benefit plans, including
those that were not funded by insurance companies. Id
12271993]
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Bruch38 the United States Supreme Court recently indicated
that courts should interpret ERISA plans according to princi-
ples of trust law.39 The Court stated in dicta that judges should
not favor either party in interpreting plan terms. If lower
courts accord this dicta the force of law, any favorable treat-
ment in interpreting terms will become suspect.40
Even without Bruch, lower courts have been somewhat re-
luctant to apply the rule of contra proferentem, a contract prin-
ciple of state common law origin, to ERISA insurance
contracts. Indeed, before Kunin, the Ninth Circuit, in Kanne v.
Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 41 proclaimed that state
common law of contract interpretation does not meet the sav-
ings-clause criteria of ERISA necessary to escape preemption. 42
The Ninth Circuit affirmed this principle after Kunin when the
court explained that the need for a uniform body of federal
common law precludes the application of state contract law.43
Despite this general language limiting the effect of state com-
mon law on ERISA contract interpretation, the Ninth Circuit
did not explicitly include the contra proferentem rule among
those state common law precepts that could not be applied to
38. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
39. Id. at 111-12.
40. See Brewer v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150, 153-54 (8th Cir.
1990), cert denied, Ill S. Ct. 2872 (1991) (following the language in Bruch to
find the rule of contra proferentem gives improper deference to one party);
Chambers v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 776 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 (S.D. Miss.
1991) (deciding trust principles in Bruch require inapplicability of the contra
proferentem rule). But see Phillips v. National Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 311-
12 (7th Cir. 1992) (declining to follow dicta in Bruch); Kunin v. Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 901 F.2d. 534, 540-41 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990), rehg
denied, 111 S. Ct. 803 (1991) (same).
41. 867 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam), cert denied, 492 U.S. 906
(1989).
42. Id. at 494. In Kanne, the Ninth Circuit faced, among other issues, the
question of whether ERISA preempted the plaintiffs' claim for reimbursement
of transportation costs. Id. This claim was "premised on the interpretation of
their insurance contract." Id. Since the common law of contract interpreta-
tion does not regulate the business of insurance, the court found that the claim
was preempted. Id; see supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's analysis of the savings clause). Nowhere in the court's opin-
ion does it specify what precept of common law contract interpretation plain-
tiffs had invoked. Thus, it is impossible to determine whether the court was
referring to the rule of contra proferentem.
43. Evans v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 1437, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam). This case, while holding that federal courts should not pick and
choose varying common law doctrines of contract interpretation from different
states, did not address whether the contra proferentem rule should be a part
of federal common law. Id. The court did not need to reach this issue because
it found the contested term to be unambiguous. Id. at 1441.
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ERISA cases.44 In Brewer v. Lincoln National Life Insurance,
Co.,45 however, the Eighth Circuit explicitly rejected the rule,
holding that ERISA preempts it and that the spirit of Bruch re-
quires that courts not defer to either party.46
Still, the Kunin court is not alone in applying the contra
proferentem rule to ERISA plans.47 The Second Circuit em-
ploys the rule of contra proferentem when the court reviews de
novo a denial of benefits under ERISA insurance plans.48 Even
after Brewer, the Eighth Circuit used the rule in an ERISA
case when extrinsic evidence failed to resolve an ambiguity in
the plan.49 The experience of courts in determining when and
44. Id- at 1440-41; Kanne, 867 F.2d at 494.
45. 921 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2872 (1991).
46. Id. at 153-54; see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing
Bruch); see also McMahan v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 888 F.2d 426,
429-30 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that, under the McCarran-Ferguson criteria, the
rule of contra proferentem does not regulate insurance and therefore is not
saved from preemption).
The Brewer court apparently elected not to incorporate the rule through
the federal common law, as the Kunin court did. See Kunin v. Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 901 F.2d. 534, 540-41 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990), reh'g
denied, 111 S. Ct. 803 (1991). Despite preemption, Brewer could have held that
the rule, in its form as a state law principle, was consistent with federal policy.
Some courts recognize the possibility that the contra proferentem rule
could be applied to insurance contracts governed by ERISA but not to other
ERISA plans that are self-funded, such as severance pay plans. See, e.g., Allen
v. Adage, Inc., 967 F.2d 695, 701 n.6 (1st Cir. 1992); Taylor v. Continental Group
Change in Control Severance Pay Plan, 933 F.2d 1227, 1233-34 (3d Cir. 1991).
Indeed, after Kunin, the Ninth Circuit did not apply the rule to a self-funded
plan that resulted from arm's-length collective bargaining. Eley v. Boeing Co.,
945 F.2d 276, 279-80 (9th Cir. 1991).
Some courts before Bruch rejected application of the rule to ERISA plans
on the ground that, since the plan administrator interprets the terms of the
plan, ambiguous language should be controlled by the administrator's interpre-
tation. See DeGeare v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 652 F. Supp. 946, 960-61
(E.D. Mo. 1986), aff'd, 837 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom. DeGeare
v. Slattery Group, Inc., 489 U.S. 1049 (1989) (vacating in accord with Bruch).
47. See, e.g., Phillips v. National Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 311-13 (7th Cir.
1992); DiDomenico v. Employers Coop. Indus. Trust, 676 F. Supp. 903, 908
(N.D. Ind. 1987); Bonar v. Barnett Bank, 488 F. Supp. 365, 369 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
48. Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 107 (2d Cir.
1991). In Masella, the court noted that without the contra proferentem rule,
beneficiaries would enjoy less protection than before the passage of ERISA,
and that the rule is consistent with trust law which aims to protect the benefi-
ciary. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959)).
49. Delk v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 104, 105-106 (8th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam). Delk appeared to limit Brewer's holding, which does not apply the
rule, to the situation where the ambiguous language of an ERISA insurance
plan can be interpreted with extrinsic evidence. See id. But see Maxa v. John
Alden Life Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 980, 985 (8th Cir. 1992) (summarily dispatching
with the contra proferentem rule as preempted state law that violates ERISA).
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whether to apply the rule demonstrates the confusion and con-
troversy surrounding this issue.50
Courts that reject contra proferentem in ERISA cases tend
to interpret the preemption clause broadly to strengthen fed-
eral uniformity, while viewing the rule as unnecessary for in-
terpreting contract terms.5' Conversely, courts that apply the
rule employ it to further the interests of employees who should
enjoy ERISA protections and to place the costs of ambiguous
terms on insurers.52
Courts have developed a body of federal common law sup-
porting and interpreting ERISA.53 The Ninth Circuit in Kunin
as well as other courts have incorporated the rule of contra
proferentem into this growing body of law.m These courts
either have pronounced the rule to apply to ERISA as a matter
of uniform federal common law,55 or have applied the rule as a
state precept.56 Either way, the ultimate concern of these
courts is that the federal common law coincide with the lan-
50. The Eighth Circuit appears inconsistent in recent decisions, reaching
contrary results in two similar cases. See supra note 49 and accompanying
text (discussing two cases that imply different understandings of the rule in
the ERISA context). The existence of different panels within a circuit reach-
ing inconsistent decisions on this issue highlights the controversy. The Tenth
Circuit has refused to address this issue by expressly taking no position on
whether the rule should apply to ERISA contracts. McGee v. Equicor Equita-
ble HCA Corp., 953 F.2d 1192, 1200 (10th Cir. 1992).
51. See Allen v. Adage, Inc., 967 F.2d 695, 701 (1st Cir. 1992); Taylor, 933
F.2d at 1233; Brewer, 921 F.2d. 150, 153; McMahan, 888 F.2d. at 429-30.
52. See Phillips, 978 F.2d at 311-12; Masella, 936 F.2d at 107.
53. See Bruch, 489 U.S. 110; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56
(1987). The replacement of diverse state laws regulating employee benefit
plans by uniform federal law was cited by the Dedeaux court as a driving pol-
icy behind the enactment of ERISA. "The uniformity of decision which the
Act is designed to foster will help administrators, fiduciaries and participants
to predict the legality of proposed actions without the necessity of reference to
varying state laws." Id.
54. The Eighth Circuit views state common law regarding ERISA poten-
tially to apply in a case unless the law is contrary to the provisions of ERISA.
Brewer, 921 F.2d at 153; Rockney v. Blohorn, 877 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1989). Ac-
cording to the Brewer court, the rule of contra proferentem violates ERISA.
921 F.2d at 153.
55. See, e.g., Phillips, 978 F.2d at 311 (declaring the rule of contra profer-
entem should be applied as a principle of federal common law); Masella, 936
F.2d at 107 ("[W]e believe that application of this rule of interpretation to de
novo review of ERISA insurance plans is an appropriate implementation of
the congressional expectation that the courts will develop a 'federal common
law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.' ").
56. E.g., DiDomenico v. Employers Coop. Indus. Trust, 676 F. Supp. 903,
908 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (applying Indiana rule of contra proferentem to ERISA
plan). Besides the contra proferentem rule, a federal court could borrow other
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guage and the employee-protection policies underlying
ERISA.57
II. KUNIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW
Against the backdrop of uncertain precedent and the loom-
ing preemption clause of ERISA, the Ninth Circuit in Kunin v.
Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co.58 squarely addressed whether
courts should apply contra proferentem in construing ERISA
insurance contracts. The court faced not only significant legal
issues, but also the very human problem of disputed coverage
for the medical expenses incurred by a child's autism. Treat-
ment of Alex Kunin's autism cost over $50,000.59 If the court
were to construe autism as a "mental illness," the Kunin family
would be responsible for over $40,000 worth of these expenses,
because the insurance contract limited disbursements for
mental illness claims to $10,000.60
The ERISA plan at issue in Kunin involved a group health
insurance policy purchased by Kunin's employer, and insured
and administered by Benefit Trust.61 The district court relied
on expert testimony establishing that autism is an organic af-
fliction. As such, it could not be defined as mental illness,
state common law contract principles. See Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d
1499, 1501-1502 (9th Cir. 1985).
57. Phillips, 978 F.2d at 311. As outlined in United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979), courts generally consider whether the
federal program or law requires uniformity, whether state law impedes the
relevant federal statute's specific objectives, arid the extent to which applica-
tion of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships based on state
law before incorporating state common law to decide a question rooted in a
federal program. In Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co., the court
found satisfaction of the Kimbell Foods test to be superfluous, since the rule of
contra proferentem already applied throughout the country. See infra Part
III.A.4 (discussing how the Kunin court could have employed the Kimbell
Foods test).
58. 910 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990), rehig denied,
111 S. Ct. 803 (1991).
59. Id. at 535.
60. Id. Young Alex Kunin received treatment for approximately 30 days
at a neuropsychiatric hospital in Los Angeles. Id. Alex's father, upon submit-
ting a claim for coverage to Benefit Trust, was informed that, based on the rec-
ommendation of its medical director, autism was a mental illness and
therefore benefits were limited to $10,000. Id. The medical director, Dr. Zolot,
apparently came to his conclusion after talking with three psychiatrists and
reading a textbook definition of "autism." Id.
61. Id. Thus, the plan was not self-funded, avoiding preemption on the
basis of the deemer clause as prescribed by the later decision of the Supreme
Court in FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 409 (1990).
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which is driven by environmental conditions. 62 Finding that
autism is not a mental illness, the district court held that Bene-
fit Trust acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in deny-
ing benefits, and ordered it to provide the Kunins full
coverage. 63
The Ninth Circuit first held that the district court correctly
found Benefit Trust's denial of benefits to be arbitrary and ca-
pricious.64 The essential basis for its holding was that Benefit
Trust behaved unreasonably in failing to investigate adequately
whether autism should be considered a mental illness.65 Given
the weight of expert evidence indicating that autism is not a
mental illness, the court found that Benefit Trust's cursory
analysis was insufficient. 66
While the court could have concluded its opinion at this
point, it added a second, alternative holding. Finding "mental
illness" to be ambiguous on a plain reading of the policy, the
court applied the rule of contra proferentem against Benefit
Trust.67 The court was especially concerned that the contract
lacked language to aid an insured in determining the meaning
of "mental illness. 68
62. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 536. The Eighth Circuit in Brewer v. National Life
Insurance Co., 921 F.2d 150, 154, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2872 (1991), concluded
that expert testimony defining "mental illness" in an ERISA plan violated the
principle that terms should be given their ordinary meaning as understood by
a layperson.
An "autistic child" can be defined as:
a child who has lost or never achieved contact with other people and
is totally withdrawn and preoccupied with his own fantasies,
thoughts, and stereotyped behavior such as twirling objects or rock-
ing. Other characteristics are indifference to parents or other people,
inability to tolerate change, and defective speech or mutism. The con-
dition is interpreted by some as organically based, and others as a
form of schizophrenia.
LONGMAN DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY 76 (Robert M.
Goldenson ed., 1984).
63. 910 F.2d at 536.
64. Id. at 538.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id The court found the term to be ambiguous because it was suscepti-
ble to different interpretations. Id. at 539 (discussing finding ambiguity). The
court apparently did not use extrinsic evidence in making this determination.
See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (noting the different manifesta-
tions of the rule depending on the use of extrinsic evidence); cf. Delk v. Dur-
ham Life Ins., Co., 959 F.2d 104, 105-06 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (applying
the rule after extrinsic evidence failed to clarify an ambiguous term in an ER-
ISA plan).
68. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 541. The court reasoned that:
In light of the drafters' expertise and experience, the insurer should
[Vol. 77:12191-232
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To reach the holding that the contra proferentem rule
should apply to ERISA insurance plans, the court needed to
contend with three legal challenges: ERISA's preemption
clause, the Supreme Court's decision in Bruch, and the
problems of fashioning contra proferentem into a federal rule.
With regard to preemption, the Ninth Circuit explained that
"this is not a preemption case."'6 9 The court's opinion sheds lit-
tle light on the reasoning behind this assertion, despite some
discussion of the preemption issue.70 The court apparently in-
ferred that Congress intended the rule to apply to ERISA plans
as a matter of federal law.71
In contrast to its cursory analysis of the preemption issue,
the court carefully considered language in Bruch, stating that
courts should afford neither party deference in interpreting the
terms of an ERISA plan.72 The Kunin court applied a narrow
reading of Bruch and held that it did not abolish the rule of
be expected to set forth any limitations on its liability clearly enough
for a common layperson to understand; if it fails to do this, it should
not be allowed to take advantage of the very ambiguities that it could
have prevented with greater diligence.
Id. at 540.
This rationale for applying the rule of contra proferentem accords with
historical reasons for the rule. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text
(explaining purposes behind the rule that enforce responsibility for the ambig-
uous language of a contract on the more sophisticated party).
69. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 539 n.8.
70. Id While the court implied in the footnote that contra proferentem
could fall within the savings clause, the court did not explicitly base its hold-
ing on savings clause analysis, explaining "this court and others have had some
difficulty in determining when a law 'regulates insurance' for the purpose of
this... analysis." Id The usual preemption analysis is absent in Kunin. The
court mentioned Kanne v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 867 F.2d
489 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam), but it did not attempt to reconcile its holding
in Kanne with the case at hand. Kanne proscribed application of state com-
mon law of contract interpretation to ERISA cases, while Kunin held that the
contra proferentem rule is not preempted. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 539 n.8. The
Kunin court, however, did note that Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 746-47 (1988), recognizes the intention of Congress to
leave intact "some state laws regulating insurance contracts ... even though
they may also 'relate to' ERISA plans." Kunin, 910 F.2d at 539 n.8.
71. See Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 311 (9th Cir.
1991); Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 1991).
But see Brewer v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150, 153 (8th Cir. 1990),
cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2872 (1991); McMahan v. New England Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 888 F.2d 426, 429-30 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that the contra proferentem
rule does not regulate the insurance industry for the purpose of the savings
clause and is contrary to the provisions of ERISA).
72. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111-12 (1989); see
Brewer, 921 F.2d at 153-54.
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contra proferentem in ERISA cases.73 The Kunin court ex-
plained that Bruch did not explicitly preclude courts and ad-
ministrators from using canons of construction to interpret
contracts governed by ERISA. 74 In addition, the court drew a
distinction between deferring to a particular party's interpreta-
tion and using a presumption in favor of a party to reach the
proper interpretation.7 5 Bruch permitted courts to use a pre-
sumption, like the contra proferentem rule, because it deferred
to a particular party's preferred interpretation only as a tie-
breaking measure. Moreover, the court stated that Bruch ex-
pressly recognized that "[t]he trust law de novo standard of re-
view" is consistent with the contract principles courts used to
interpret terms of employee benefit plans before the enactment
of ERISA.76 Because prior to ERISA, courts employed the con-
tra proferentem rule to such plans, the Kunin court stated that
the Supreme Court in Bruch "intended no wholesale rejection
of prevailing principles of plan interpretation when it looked to
trust law on the subject of the appropriate standard of judicial
review."77
Finally, in determining how to apply the rule of contra
proferentem through federal law, the Ninth Circuit reserved
the question of whether the rule should be made a part of uni-
form federal common law or should be incorporated from state
law to apply to ERISA.78 The court decided the rule could ap-
ply through either means.79 Because every state applies the
rule to insurance contracts, the Ninth Circuit decided not "to
controvert an opinion held with such unanimity in the various
states and to adopt a contrary view as the federal rule."8 0 The
court also noted that factors usually leading states to apply the
73. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 541.
74. Id.
75. Id. The court drew two analogies to support its distinction. First,
while a criminal jury cannot defer to the defendant's plea of "not guilty," it
must still presume his innocence. Id. Second, a baseball umpire cannot defer
to the runner's claim that he is safe, but can use the rule of "tie goes to the
runner." Id.
76. Id. (quoting Bruch, 489 U.S. at 112).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 539-40. The court in discussing the incorporation of state law
into federal law took notice of the test stated in United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979). The court concluded, however, that appli-
cation of the Kimbell Foods test was unnecessary and did not control. Kunin,
910 F.2d at 539-40.
79. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 540.
80. Id. Like the court's handling of the preemption issue, its discussion of
the federal law questions does not include a clear explanation of its reasoning.
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contra proferentem rule were present in Kunin: the insurance
plan did not result from collective bargaining, and it was writ-
ten solely by Benefit Trust.8 '
The Ninth Circuit in Kunin attempted to resolve the ten-
sions arising from the divergent legal principles relating to ER-
ISA and insurance contracts. The court's holdings, particularly
that involving the rule of contra proferentem, could have im-
portant implications for the future.8 2 On a practical level, con-
sistent application of the rule could encourage insurance
companies to draft clearer policies and increase the cost of cov-
erage for insurers. More theoretically, applying the rule may
limit the scope of ERISA's preemption clause, and perhaps ulti-
mately undermine ERISA's concern for national uniformity.
At the same time, however, Kunin suggests how applying the
rule may further ERISA's principles of employee protection.
III. THE GOOD INTENTIONS AND FLAWED
REASONING OF KUNIN
A. A CRITIQUE OF KUNIN
The Ninth Circuit in Kunin acted quite boldly to reach an
equitable result by applying the rule of contra proferentem to
the Kunins' ERISA plan. The persuasive power of the court's
holding, however, is undermined by reasoning that fails to ad-
dress squarely a number of the case's key issues.
1. Finding Ambiguity
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the trial court's finding of am-
biguity de novo, concluding that the term "mental illness" was
ambiguous on its face.8 3 Certainly, the words "mental illness,"
left undefined, are susceptible to varying but equally reason-
able interpretations.8 4 The court, without reference to extrin-
sic evidence, held that the term was ambiguous.8 5
81. 1d&
82. The amici curiae appearances by the Health Insurance Association of
America and the American Council of Life Insurance on behalf of Benefit
Trust demonstrate the interest the case attracted and the significant potential
impact of the decision. See id
83. Id at 541.
84. See WINDT, supra note 12, § 6.02, at 288.
85. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 541. The court's finding of ambiguity, however,
was not without apparent confusion. The court found the term to be ambigu-
ous on its face, which could have been enough to require automatic application
of the contra proferentem rule under its most mechanical manifestation. Id.
Yet the court noted the opinions of experts testifying on behalf of Kunin. Id.
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A sounder application of the contra proferentem rule, how-
ever, would involve the use of extrinsic evidence to ascertain
the parties' intent or to dispel a term's ambiguity before turn-
ing to the rule. 6 Thus the words and conduct of the bargaining
parties themselves, and not the court, would explain the con-
tract's meaning. By first evaluating extrinsic indicators of in-
tent, such as the course of dealing between the parties and
customs and usages within the industry, the court would have
made use of the rule truly a last resort.8 7 The Kunin court's
failure to consider extrinsic evidence (or at least to address
whether extrinsic evidence should be used to ascertain intent)
prevented it from fully exploring the appropriateness of apply-
ing the rule in this case.
2. The Court's Preemption Analysis
The Kunin court declared that it was not faced with a pre-
emption case.88 By doing so, however, the court ignored impor-
tant precedent, even within the Ninth Circuit, pointing toward
preemption.8 9 The court may have inferred that, because, in its
view, the rule of contra proferentem should be a part of federal
law, ipso facto ERISA should not preempt it.90 Still, by not ac-
knowledging the body of ERISA preemption law, the court ap-
While extrinsic evidence, like expert testimony, may be examined to clarify
the meaning of an ambiguous term to prevent application of the rule, the court
examined this expert testimony to support a determination of ambiguity. Id
The court was not compelled to weigh expert evidence to support its finding of
ambiguity, and merely clouded its reasoning by doing so.
86. At least one eminent commentator agrees that the rule should be ap-
plied only after extrinsic evidence is examined to provide insight into the
meaning of an ambiguous term. See WInDT, supra note 12, § 6.02, at 282-83.
Kunin cites Windt's language but appears to ignore its mandate to use the rule
as a last resort. 910 F.2d at 539. As noted by Professor Farnsworth, courts are
free to ascertain the meaning of ambiguous terms, as understood by the par-
ties, through the use of such "extrinsic aids" as evidence of prior negotiations,
course of dealing, course of performance, or usage. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 7.10, at 511 (1990). Such evidence should be used to provide an
ambiguous term with a meaning that it can reasonably hold; extrinsic evidence
should be disallowed when it contradicts or supplements the term in question.
See i&i § 7.12, at 527. Commentators critical of the rule grudgingly conclude
that if extrinsic evidence fails to clarify the term in question, then the rule
should be applied. See e.g., Benz, supra note 21, at 77; Miller, supra note 11, at
1868.
87. In cases where the insurance company is truly the sole drafter of the
terms, however, the availability of helpful extrinsic evidence seems unlikely.
88. 910 F.2d at 539 n.8.
89. See Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 494 (9th Cir.
1988).
90. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 540.
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pears to have knowingly ignored an analysis damaging to its
holding or at least to have misunderstood the preemption issue.
This inattention is particularly troubling because a formi-
dable argument can be advanced that ERISA should preempt
the contra proferentem rule. In Brewer v. Lincoln National
Life Insurance, Co.,9 ' the Eighth Circuit held that the contra
proferentem rule is a general principle of state contract law
that affects employee benefit plans and, therefore, that the rule
is subject to preemption. 92 ERISA's savings clause does not
preserve the rule because, in the Eighth Circuit's view, contra
proferentem does not "regulate the insurance industry."93
Therefore, as a "state law" that does not regulate insurance,
the broad sweep of the preemption clause dictates that the con-
tra proferentem rule cannot apply to ERISA plans.9 4
Despite this persuasive case for preemption, the Kunin
court properly held that the contra proferentem rule should ap-
ply to at least some ERISA contracts. In determining whether
ERISA preempts a state law, the ultimate inquiry should focus
on whether Congress intended preemption.95 By applying the
contra proferentem rule as a matter of federal law, the Kunin
court implied that Congress did not intend to provide less pro-
tection to an insured under an ERISA plan than he enjoyed
under state common law prior to the passage of ERISA.96 The
purposes of ERISA, as found in the statute and as interpreted
by courts, clearly demonstrate that Congress intended to but-
tress the rights of employees and their beneficiaries under a
91. 921 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2872 (1991).
92. Id at 153. The Eighth Circuit apparently viewed the rule as inconsis-
tent with the policies behind ERISA, thereby preventing it from coming back
into the federal common law.
93. Id In the Eighth Circuit's view, the savings clause exempts from pre-
emption only state laws that regulate insurance; that is, laws that spread poli-
cyholder risk, make up an integral part of the relationship between the
insured and insurer, and apply only to the insurance industry. Because the
court viewed the rule as a general rule of contract construction, it was not spe-
cifically designed to regulate the insurance industry nor does it spread policy-
holder risk. Id
94. Id Even the Ninth Circuit imposed a potential limitation on the ap-
plication of the contra proferentem rule. See Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 494 (9th Cir. 1988). By holding that ERISA preempts
unspecified state common-law principles of contract interpretation, id&, Kanne
logically could require preemption of the rule. The court in Kunin was silent
as to this possibility.
95. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987).
96. See Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 107 (2nd
Cir. 1991); see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (describing the pur-
poses behind ERISA).
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uniform scheme.97 Applying the contra proferentem rule thus
fulfills Congressional intent.
In addition, while the Kunin court did not undertake an
analysis of ERISA's savings and deemer clauses, 98 the court
could have relied on them to save the rule from preemption. In
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,99 the
Supreme Court concluded that "the deemer clause makes ex-
plicit Congress' intention to include laws that regulate insur-
ance contracts within the scope of the insurance laws preserved
by the saving clause."10 0 As a state law identified primarily as a
rule regulating insurance contracts, 10 1 it follows that the contra
proferentem rule should be saved from preemption. 0 2 This in-
terpretation of ERISA complies with the common-sense re-
quirement in preemption case law, because the rule plainly
regulates insurance contracts. 0 3
Furthermore, the other criteria cited in ERISA case law
describing "insurance" for the purpose of the savings clause0 4
do not foreclose application of the rule as Brewer suggests.'0 5
Indeed, properly analyzed, the rule survives application of the
considerations employed by the Eighth Circuit in Brewer30 6 and
by the Supreme Court in ERISA preemption cases.'0 7 First,
the rule effectively transfers or spreads an insured's risk by
making coverage more likely when the policy contains ambigu-
ous terms. Second, the rule has served a longstanding and im-
portant role in balancing the relationship between the insurer
and the insured. Third, the rule, while not exclusively limited
to insurance contracts, has evolved to be identified particularly
97. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113-14 (1989).
98. See supra note 33 (providing the language of the clauses).
99. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
100. Id. at 741.
101. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text (outlining the history of
the rule as applied to insurance contracts).
102. Kunin does mention that the enactment of the savirgs clause by Con-
gress indicates an intent to allow some state laws that relate to ERISA plans
to escape preemption. Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 539
n.8 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 803
(1991).
103. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985).
104. See Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 48-49.
105. See Brewer v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 150, 153 (8th Cir.
1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2872 (1992).
106. Id
107. See, e.g., Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 48-49; Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 743.
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with insurance contracts. 0 8
As a widely used common-law rule that gives the benefit of
the doubt to employees, contra proferentem supports the pur-
poses of ERISA and arguably fits within ERISA's savings
clause. Therefore, the Kunin court arrived at the best result in
deciding not to preempt the rule of contra proferentem. The
court's opinion suffered, however, from a failure to recognize
and distinguish the contrary case law, and to explore fully how
the rule serves the purposes and language of ERISA. As a re-
sult, the Ninth Circuit's analysis is weaker than it needed to be.
3. The Application of Bruch
The Ninth Circuit's treatment of the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch109 essentially in-
volved sound analysis of what was, in fact, a relatively narrow
holding. The Bruch rule was not meant to stand as a compre-
hensive umbrella covering all cases touching ERISA. Bruch
simply held that, based on the principles of trust law, a decision
by a plan administrator or trustee, where the governing plan
does not provide for discretion to determine eligibility for bene-
fits or to construe plan terms, should be reviewed de novo.110
The context of the Supreme Court's statement regarding undue
deference to a particular party's interpretation of a plan under
ERISA militates against using it to strike down the contra
proferentem rule. The Court made the statement while indi-
108. No cases applying the rule to ERISA plans undertake the analysis of
the McCarran-Ferguson criteria for a practice regulating insurance. A signifi-
cant argument, however, can be asserted that the rule does regulate insurance.
See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text (outlining application of the rule
to insurance contracts).
In any event, a finding that the rule meets the McCarran-Ferguson crite-
ria does not stretch the criteria's meaning substantially more than the analysis
of the mandated-benefit law in Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 744, which es-
caped preemption as a law that regulated insurance. Indeed, there is no sug-
gestion in the legislative history of ERISA "that the pre-emption provision
was broadened out of any concern about state regulation of insurance con-
tracts," except to the extent such state laws may conflict. Id. at 745 n.23. The
application of the rule, as a common-law rule shared among the states, would
not cause conflict.
The strongest argument against saving the rule from preemption is that
the rule cannot be viewed to apply exclusively to the insurance industry be-
cause it applies to contracts other than insurance policies. See Dedeaux, 481
U.S. at 51 (finding that a state law of bad faith most commonly associated with
the insurance industry fails the test of exclusivity for the purpose of savings-
clause analysis because the bad faith law applies generally to all contracts).
109. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
110. Id at 115.
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cating that an interpretation or decision by a plan administrator
inherently does not deserve the deference of judicial review
under the arbitrary and capricious standard.111 Thus, the Court
was implicitly limiting the power of insurers and employers,
and protecting employees and beneficiaries when discretionary
language was absent from the plan. The Bruch Court's con-
cern was that applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to
a denial of benefits when an ERISA plan did not give the ad-
ministrator discretion, "would afford less protection to employ-
ees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was
enacted."'112 Therefore, the dicta in Bruch that courts have in-
voked to strike down application of the rule to ERISA plans ac-
tually could be interpreted to support the Kunin court's
concern for the employees' interests. 113
The Kunin court also duly recognized that Bruch took con-
tract principles into account in its holding.114 Bruch expressly
asserted that the trust law de novo standard of review is consis-
tent with law prior to ERISA, when contract principles gov-
erned employee benefit plans.1 15  Because the contra
proferentem rule applied to such plans prior to ERISA, Bruch
implies that its holding would not be contrary to the rule.
Even if Bruch could be read to apply only trust law to ERISA
plans, the rule as applied through trust law conceivably could
be employed against the insurer when doubts arose as to the
plan's language. 1 6
Finally, the Ninth Circuit in Kunin persuasively distin-
111. Id. at 114.
112. Id.
113. The language used by the Court in Bruch underscores that it did not
contemplate striking down the contra proferentem rule: "As they do with con-
tractual provisions, courts construe terms in trust agreements without defer-
ring to either party's interpretation." Id (emphasis added). Presumably, the
Court was aware that courts frequently applied the rule to contracts. By ad-
ding the emphasized clause, the Court could not have meant that the rule in-
volved deferring to either party's interpretation. Otherwise, the sentence
makes little sense.
114. Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 541 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 803 (1991).
115. Bruch, 910 F.2d at 112.
116. See Brenneman v. Bennet, 420 F.2d 19, 24 (8th Cir. 1970) (construing
ambiguous terms in a trust instrument against the drafter). The Eighth Cir-
cuit in Brewer v. Lincoln National Life Insurance, Co., 921 F.2d 150 (8th Cir.
1990), apparently did not recognize this intra-circuit case in deciding that trust
principles forbade application of the contra proferentem rule. See id. at 153-54;
see also RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959) (stating that trust property
should be handled for the benefit of the beneficiary).
Thus, if trust law exclusively governs ERISA plans as suggested by Bruch,
1240 [Vol. 77:1219
ERISA INSURANCE PLANS
guished deference to a party's interpretation of an ambiguous
term, at issue in Bruch, from a presumption in favor of a
party.117 The contra proferentem rule applies only when the
parties' interpretations are no longer helpful in explaining the
meaning of an ambiguous term, and thus does not defer to a
party during the process of interpretation. 118 In effect, contra
proferentem does not interpret a contract but rather constructs
it in the fairest possible way after all other interpretive at-
tempts have failed.
4. Does Kunin Make the Contra Proferentem Rule Federal
Law?
By failing to decide whether the contra proferentem rule
should apply to ERISA plans as a matter of incorporating a
state rule or under uniform federal common law,1 9 the Kunin
court unnecessarily created a legal question that it later was
forced to answer. 2 0 The Kunin court claimed that the rule
would control as a matter of federal law under either theory.121
Despite the court's ambivalent treatment of this issue, it acted
properly, because Congress intended courts to create federal
common law to fill the gaps of ERISA.122 The court did not
need to be concerned with incorporating state law because the
mandate for a uniform system of law under ERISA permitted
the court to establish any federal rule that did not violate the
federal statute.12S
Still, the court could have attempted to apply the rule as
an incorporated state law through the test outlined by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.'24 Ac-
cording to Kimbell Foods, a state law cannot be interpreted as
applying to a federal program if its application would under-
the contra proferentem rule arguably could still apply when terms are
ambiguous.
117. See Kunin, 910 F.2d at 541.
118. Id
119. See id at 540.
120. See Evans v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 1437, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1990)
(per curiam) (determining that uniform federal common law controls).
121. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 540.
122. See Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 311 (9th Cir.
1992); Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 1991).
123. If the rule is viewed as a "state law" relating to an employee benefit
plan not saved by the savings clause of ERISA, its preemption obviously would
follow. Judicial sleight of hand, however, can circumvent preemption by call-
ing the rule a federal rule consistent with the purpose of ERISA. See, e.g.,
Kunin, 910 F.2d at 540.
124. 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979).
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mine the uniformity of the federal scheme or frustrate federal
objectives.125 Conversely, Kimbell Foods states that a uniform
federal rule is not appropriate if it would disrupt existing com-
mercial relationships based on state law.126
In Kunin, a uniform federal rule of contra proferentem
would have little disruptive effect on commercial expectations
because businesses have traditionally operated under the rule
as a matter of state law.-27 In addition, incorporation of the
rule as a matter of state law would also meet the Kimbell Foods
requirements. Because every state recognizes the rule in some
form, incorporating it would not endanger the uniformity re-
quired by ERISA. Similarly, applying the rule would further,
rather than frustrate, the ERISA goal of uniformly protecting
the interests of employee benefits packages. The Ninth Circuit
decided not to incorporate the rule as a state common-law prin-
ciple, but, as this analysis suggests, a discussion of the Kimbell
Foods factors could have buttressed the court's determination
that the rule should apply to ERISA plans.
In sum, Kunin achieved a reasonable outcome that relied
on common law not tailor-made for evaluating ambiguity in
ERISA plans. Although ERISA and pertinent case law could
be read to mandate application of the rule, the overwhelming
complexity of ERISA, with its preemption clause and multi-fac-
eted governance, makes any blanket recommendation difficult.
To apply the rule reflexively to all ERISA plans would ignore
the diverse and unique arrangements that ERISA covers.
Some plans may be better suited to contra proferentem than
others, depending upon the balance between the purposes of
the rule and the goals of ERISA. The court in Kunin accom-
plished what it could, but it failed to articulate in a satisfying
manner why and when the rule should apply. The following
proposals provide alternative guides for applying the rule to dif-
ferent ERISA plans.
B. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS TO CONSTRUING TERMS AGAINST
THE INSURER
This Comment proposes to apply the rule of contra profer-
entem to ERISA plans while recognizing the diversity of agree-
ments that ERISA governs. The different manifestations of
ERISA plans, coupled with the existing body of preemption
125. I&
126. Id. at 729.
127. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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law, make wholesale application of the rule to all ERISA con-
tracts a challenging and potentially inappropriate chore. This
Comment proposes that courts apply the rule only in particu-
larly appropriate circumstances. As an alternative, second pro-
posal, Congress could settle the matter by amending ERISA to
permit courts to construe ambiguous terms in the best interest
of the employee or beneficiary.
1. Application of the Rule, and Consideration of Extrinsic
Evidence, Should Depend upon the Type of ERISA
Plan
A number of considerations are important for justifying
the application of the contra proferentem rule to ERISA plans.
Was the insured sophisticated? If a sophisticated employer
purchased group insurance for employees, was the contract a
result of collective bargaining with employee representation?
If the plan is self-insured, did the employees collectively or in-
dividually bargain its terms? Was extrinsic evidence available
to show the parties' intent as to the meaning of the ambiguous
term? Of course, these questions must be answered in the con-
text of ERISA's purposes and provisions. Depending on the cir-
cumstances of the contract, the contra proferentem rule may be
applied immediately or as a last resort, and in some cases, appli-
cation of the rule may be inappropriate.
a. The Unsophisticated Individual Insured
While an ERISA plan rarely involves an insurance contract
directly between the insurer and the insured individual,128 ad-
dressing this relationship puts the rest of this proposal in con-
text. If such a case arises, the contra proferentem rule should
mandate that ambiguous terms be construed against the in-
surer. 29 The rule should only be employed, however, after
consideration of extrinsic evidence to ascertain intent. In those
situations where extrinsic evidence does not exist or would not
be helpful, application of the rule would be proper simply on
finding ambiguity.
For example, where the employee, or insured, deals di-
rectly with the insurer without the benefit of legal representa-
128. To be covered by ERISA, a plan generally is established and main-
tained by an employer, an employee organization, or both. See 29 U.S.C
§ 1002(1) (1988).
129. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (citing a variety of
sources to support application of the rule in this context).
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tion or special resources, the resulting writing would bear
strong resemblance to a traditional adhesion contract. In this
instance, evidence of bargaining, negotiation, and shared crea-
tion of terms would be absent or of little use due to the differ-
ence in bargaining power between the parties. Many judges in
such cases have applied the rule to insurance contracts without
examining extrinsic evidence because searching for such evi-
dence when the insurer is solely responsible for drafting the
document is a futile endeavor. The only evidence of an agree-
ment are the terms themselves, so any ambiguity leaves a court
without alternate interpretive methods. Therefore, when
terms are not negotiated and the bargaining leverage is signifi-
cantly unequal between the employee and the insurer, applying
the rule in ERISA cases would conform to the rule's history
and rationale. In theory, courts should always consider extrin-
sic evidence before applying the rule, but reality suggests that
examining extrinsic evidence in these types of cases will serve
little purpose, and thus courts will likely in practice apply the
rule directly.
b. The Unsophisticated Employer
In the purchase of a group policy, an unsophisticated em-
ployer has substantially the same characteristics as an individ-
ual insured. Extrinsic evidence to clarify an ambiguous term
likely would be sparse if the employer accepted the terms of a
form contract without negotiation or bargaining. Like an indi-
vidual insured faced with a skilled, well-resourced insurance
company, an employer may remain vulnerable, to the point
that application of the rule makes sense. The contra profer-
entem rule's spirit of fairness and meaningful bargaining sup-
ports favoring the insured, despite the fact that the insured
employee did not purchase the policy directly from the insur-
ance company. Extrinsic evidence could be considered if avail-
able, but would likely shed little light on the contract.
c. The Sophisticated Employer with Collective Bargaining
In other ERISA cases, extrinsic evidence can provide valu-
able information about the parties' intentions. The information
can make the rule a useful last resort in interpreting ambigu-
ous contract terms. Where a sophisticated employer purchases
insurance with substantial employee input, as through collec-
tive bargaining, the resulting agreement tends to resemble a
contract whose terms are negotiated among informed, equal
1244 [Vol. 77:1219
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parties. 30 Although the rule still may apply in such a case, the
meaningful give-and-take between the insurer and the insured
may yield more direct evidence for ambiguous terms. Put sim-
ply, it becomes possible to glean intent on the part of the in-
sured because he expresses his intent by meaningfully
participating in the drafting of the plan.
d. The Sophisticated Employer Without Collective Bargaining
A more difficult analysis regarding the purchase of group
insurance occurs when the employer-purchaser is sophisticated,
but the employees did not undertake any significant bargaining
role in the formulation of the insurance contract. Extrinsic evi-
dence may be available to develop the meaning of a term be-
cause the employer contributed to the drafting of the plan. The
employer, however, may not always act in the best interest of
its employees in buying particular coverage. 131 If courts can de-
termine that the employer did bargain in good faith on behalf
of its employees, then the consideration of extrinsic evidence to
interpret the term accords with the rule's balance between its
application as a last resort and its ultimate protection of the in-
sured's interests. 32
Without any proof that the sophisticated employer bar-
130. In other words, a "sophisticated insured" exception to automatic appli-
cation of the rule of contra proferentem should be accepted in ERISA cases.
The Ninth Circuit after Kunin decided not to construe automatically ambigu-
ons terms against the insurer when the contract was the result of collective
bargaining. Eley v. Boeing Co., 945 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1991). This holding
accords with Kunin's implication that the rule (in its version that does not re-
quire extrinsic evidence) should not apply when the plan is collectively bar-
gained. See Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990), reh/g denied, 111 S. Ct. 803 (1991).
131. The employer may have a rational self-interest in purchasing clear
and adequate coverage for its employees. First, the employer may want to
avoid any potential litigation or administrative trouble that unclear terms
might bring. Second, the employer may obtain good coverage to retain and at-
tract quality employees. To the extent, however, employers may want to hold
down insurance costs and do not share a personal concern for an employee's
particular insurance needs, employers may not be expected to always obtain a
policy that an employee would purchase.
132. Determining whether an employer sought to purchase a policy in the
employee's best interest would prove to be a thorny factual pursuit. Possible
considerations could include the amount of effort used to buy the policy, the
quality of the coverage, and the history of the employer's treatment of its em-
ployees. The difficulty of making this determination, in conjunction with the
time required to address this relatively collateral issue, militate against at-
tempting to discern employer motivation absent unusual factual
circumstances.
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gained on behalf of the employees, a court faces the question of
whether considering extrinsic evidence to dispel contract ambi-
guities is unfair to the employee-beneficiary. Application of the
rule in such a case would involve forsaking relevant extrinsic
evidence drawn from a significant bargaining relationship in
favor of a broader policy of fairness toward the employee-bene-
ficiary. This case exemplifies how the contra proferentem rule
does not translate comfortably to all ERISA plans.
e. Self-Insured Plans
Because state laws that affect self-insured plans are not
saved from preemption by ERISA,133 application of the contra
proferentem rule to such plans would require courts to com-
pletely ignore the clear mandate for preemption. But, follow-
ing the lead of Kunin, a court could apply the rule as a matter
of federal law, rather than state law. The purposes behind the
rule, as well as ERISA's general protection of employees, would
justify applying the rule to self-insured plans that cannot be ex-
plained through the use of extrinsic evidence.134 Here, as in
the aforementioned types of plans, the value of using extrinsic
evidence to clarify ambiguous terms depends on whether the
employer and employee assumed a significantly equal bargain-
ing relationship, and whether terms were actually negotiated.
133. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 409 (1990).
134. After all, the employer acts more or less as an insurer, with the poten-
tially same level of resources and expertise as an insurance company. Thus
the employer could draw up a form contract that employees essentially must
take or leave. The distinction made in preemption analyses between self-in-
sured plans and other ERISA plans does not meaningfully address the applica-
tion of the contra proferentem rule. See i&. at 409-410.
A policy argument, however, could be advanced that applying the rule to
self-insured plans would discourage employers from providing insurance cov-
erage because they would fear the potential costs of ambiguous plans. More-
over, the relationship between employer and employee may not be as
adversarial as that between an insurance company and the insured. Despite
these considerations running against the rule, the rule should still apply. If
plan language is truly ambiguous and extrinsic evidence cannot clarify the lan-
guage, no alternative exists but to construe the language against the drafter.
The requirement of examining extrinsic evidence militates against concerns
about reflexive application of the rule. Cf Eley, 945 F.2d at 280 (declining to
apply the rule to a self-funded plan resulting from collective bargaining that
could otherwise be interpreted with helpful evidence). Furthermore, two pur-
poses behind the rule remain valid in the context of self-insured plans. First,
since many employers that can afford self-insurance tend to be large enough
to provide a sufficient pool of resources, the sophistication of the employer fre-
quently overshadows the bargaining power of the employee. Second, the lan-
guage of a self-insured plan may not have resulted from any negotiation, so
that the employee would be bound by an adhesion contract.
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For example, if a sophisticated union bargained with an em-
ployer to create a self-insured plan, extrinsic evidence may
foreclose application of the rule. Risk managers or attorneys
representing the union and participating in the drafting of the
agreement may expect certain interpretations based on indus-
try custom. A longstanding bargaining relationship between
the employer and union may produce evidence of a course of
dealing or course of performance to clarify terms.
2. An End Run Around the Common Law: Amending
ERISA
The above proposal provides a fair guide for how courts can
apply the rule of contra proferentem in a sensitive fashion. Ap-
plication of a state common-law rule to cases governed by a
sweeping federal statute with a broad preemption provision,
however, is still likely to engender some controversy. 35 Kunin
suggests that a court could effectively bypass some of the obsta-
cles by pronouncing that application of the rule within the fed-
eral common law nestles comfortably within the panoply of
ERISA law.136 A better alternative, which would express the
clear intent of Congress while dispatching every current obsta-
cle to the rule, would be to amend ERISA.
The amendment could read:
After considering extrinsic evidence when appropriate to ascertain
the meaning of an ambiguous term in a written instrument governed
by this statute, an ambiguous term should be construed in the best in-
terest of the employee or beneficiary participating in the plan.
Courts would employ the de novo standard of review when
Bruch so requires 37 and use the usual common-law methods of
135. The current disagreement among the federal circuit courts demon-
strates the controversy surrounding common-law application of the rule to
ERISA cases. See notes 46-48 (describing the different ways that circuits have
reacted to this question).
136. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 539-40; see Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
978 F.2d 302, 311 (9th Cir. 1992); Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 936
F.2d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 1991).
137. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). Bruch
requires a court to review a decision by a plan administrator de novo when
benefit plan language does not provide the administrator with discretion to in-
terpret the plan. I&i A very interesting question is whether inclusion of dis-
cretionary language would prohibit a court from finding a term ambiguous,
thereby preventing application of the rule. If the term is susceptible to two
different reasonable interpretations and therefore ambiguous, a decision to fol-
low the insurer's interpretation by an administrator with discretionary author-
ity may withstand judicial review based on the arbitrary and capricious
standard. In other words, if the administrator's interpretation is reasonable,
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determining whether terms are ambiguous. 138 Thus, existing
challenges in the law related to preemption and Bruch's dicta
about undue deference would be moot. Because ERISA would
plainly endorse construction of ambiguous terms in favor of the
insured, courts could not interpret ERISA to preempt this prin-
ciple. To the extent it suggests otherwise, the dicta in Bruch
would be superseded. In addition, any concerns about making
contra proferentem a part of federal common law would be ir-
relevant in the face of statutory language. Furthermore, self-
insured plans would be covered, and in cases where a sophisti-
cated employer purchases a group policy without employee rep-
resentation, a court would be required to construe an
ambiguous term in favor of the beneficiary-employee. 39
the court could not find ambiguity and apply the rule. This analysis, however,
is somewhat circular. The reasonableness of two interpretations of an ambigu-
ous term may be substantively different than the reasonableness of an admin-
istrator's decision to interpret the term to deny benefits. It may be
unreasonable for an administrator to accept the insurer's interpretation in
every case where an ambiguous term is found. Bruch (in its language and ap-
plication concerning plans without discretionary language) and ERISA would
become dead letters if insurers could escape any meaningful judicial review by
simply adding a provision in the plan conferring the administrator with discre-
tion to interpret the plan. A judge sits in the same position as an administra-
tor in determining whether plan language is ambiguous, and should have
power to review de novo plan interpretation. See Taylor v. Continental Group
Change in Control of Severance Pay Plan, 933 F.2d 1227, 1232 (3d Cir. 1991)
(stating that determination of whether a plan term is ambiguous is a question
of law). Another alternative would involve requiring plan administrators to
apply the rule of contra proferentem after using extrinsic aids to attempt to
clarify the ambiguity. Both of these suggestions, while in accord with the
spirit of ERISA to protect employees, appear to fly in the face of Bruch's im-
plied grant of unreviewable discretion to plan administrators empowered with
a discretionary provision. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
138. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (describing ways to de-
termine ambiguity).
139. While this Comment has addressed welfare plans under ERISA, the
author can think of no reason why pension plans also could not be governed
by the amendment. Indeed, pension plans prior to ERISA were construed us-
ing usual contract principles.
Generally, a pension plan should be construed liberally in favor of
employees and should be construed against the employer, at least
where the employer is the drafter, or where the plan was not negoti-
ated .... [I]t has also been held that where such an agreement is am-
biguous, matters outside the writing may be considered as an aid to
interpretation.
70 C.J.S. Pensions § 17 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
Any concerns about disincentives to the formation of pension plans that
application of the rule may create are overstated. Extrinsic evidence may be
more available with employee input into pension plan language, thereby limit-
ing the frequency of the rule's application. In addition, the benefits of at-
tracting and retaining employees by providing pension benefits would
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The rationale for the contra proferentem rule supports the
amendment. Insurance companies and employers would be en-
couraged to draft terms of ERISA plans clearly.140 If such clar-
ity becomes inefficient or succumbs to the facts of a particular
case, the cost of ambiguity would be spread primarily across the
insurance system or the self-insured pool, rather than
shouldered by a particular individual. This spreading of costs
seems appropriate in an industry designed to protect individu-
als by sharing the costs of misfortune.
CONCLUSION
In Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co., the Ninth
Circuit broadly held that the rule of contra proferentem should
be applied to ERISA plans. This Comment suggests that
Kunin failed to analyze adequately potential preemption of the
rule by ERISA, the question of whether extrinsic evidence
should be considered to clarify ambiguous terms before apply-
ing the rule, and the connection between the rule and the pur-
poses of ERISA. Furthermore, because the court did not
extend its reasoning to encompass the diversity of ERISA plans
to which the rule could be applied, Kunin cannot be read to
control all varieties of ERISA contracts. Carefully applying the
rule through federal common law, with sensitivity to the equi-
ties of the bargaining process behind each type of ERISA con-
tract, or amending ERISA to permit courts to construe
outweigh the costs of the risk that the rule may be applied to a plan. More-
over, as stated in the preceding paragraph, the fact that ERISA pension plans
are subject to the rule blunts any unexpected expense that the ERISA rule
would create. Finally, while an employer may act in the employee's best inter-
ests in creating a pension plan, a court must still find a way to construe an
ambiguous provision that is impervious to extrinsic aids, and the fact that the
employer is responsible for drafting the language helps a court construct a
meaning that favors the employee. Cf Taylor, 933 F.2d at 1233-34 (implying
the rule would apply to severance pay plans as a last resort).
A possibly radical effect of this amendment, however, requires some dis-
cussion. The amendment, if applied to plan administrators with discretion to
interpret terms, as provided in the plan, could essentially overrule Bruch's
holding that such discretion deserves great deference. See Bruch, 478 U.S. at
115; cf. Masella, 936 F.2d at 107 (applying the rule to plans reviewed de novo).
Thus, the amendment could force a plan administrator faced with ambiguous
language to favor the employee after considering extrinsic evidence. This
Comment does not shrink in the shadow of this consequence, but argues that
Congress could not have intended to empower plan administrators in a man-
ner such that insurers and employers are encouraged to draft unclear plan
terms in order to impose their own interpretations upon the employee-
beneficiary.
140. See Kunin, 910 F.2d at 540.
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ambiguous terms in ERISA plans in favor of the plan benefici-
ary, would address these weaknesses and fulfill ERISA's prom-
ise of fairness and protection for employees.
